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NGO Responses to Counterterrorism Regulations After 
September 11th 
By Elizabeth A. Bloodgood1 and Joannie Tremblay-Boire2 
We examine variations in nongovernmental organizations' (NGOs') responses to post-2001 changes in 
counterterrorism regulations in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. 
We connect the presence of different ideal type responses—hiding, shirking, vocal opposition, 
participating, and litigating—to the extent of change in regulations, the degree of uncertainty (and 
risk) created by new regulations, and the availability of political institutions for NGO participation in 
policy-making. 
Why have nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in different national contexts taken such different 
approaches in responding to recent changes in counterterrorism regulations? Given that changes in 
regulation were inspired by a transnational threat causing a strong shock to all countries, we might 
expect that NGOs, particularly international NGOs (INGOs) operating in multiple countries affected by 
the new transnational terrorist threat, would respond similarly to protect their interests. A common 
response would enable coordination among international NGOs and a stronger global campaign to fight 
counterterrorism laws with negative consequences for civil society. The popular media and academic 
literature warn of potentially dire consequences if regulations continue to tighten (Howell and Lind 
2009; Sidel 2004). We find that INGO responses to changes in counterterrorism regulation have 
ranged dramatically from hiding and shirking, to vocal opposition, to participation in policy-making 
and court challenges to reverse or reinterpret law. 
We examine NGOs' responses to new counterterrorism regulations (post-2001) in five major OECD 
countries—the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Germany, and Japan. These are the 
countries with the most to fear from recent anti-Western transnational terrorism and the countries 
where most international NGOs operate. In each country, we examine the nature of NGO responses to 
counterterrorism regulation and possible explanations for the nature of those responses. We conclude 
that the extent of change in regulations, the amount of uncertainty created, and the availability of 
access to participate in policy-making have an important effect on the nature of NGO responses to 
government regulations. 
These findings have interesting implications for the regulation of INGOs and our understanding of their 
likely responses in the future to changes due to transnational terrorism or other global shocks. 
National institutions are very important for NGOs, even international NGOs that cross national borders, 
as NGOs adapt their organization and operations in response to the institutions of the countries in 
which they operate. International NGOs do not operate at the international level above the nation-
state, but on the ground within complex and overlapping national legal jurisdictions that complicate 
their operations. 
NGO Responses to Changing Regulations 
National regulations, including counterterrorism legislation as applied to NGOs, constrain NGO 
behavior by limiting their legal identities, permitted activities, and access to resources. Such 
regulations serve as formal institutions directing NGOs to behave in ways desirable to states by 
incentivizing positive behaviors (from the point of view of the state) and making illegal and punishing 
negative behaviors. As argued in new institutionalism and the new economics of organization, formal 
institutions such as regulations exert both coercive and normative pressures on NGO behavior by 
laying out what they can and cannot do and what is thus appropriate or inappropriate (North 1990; 
Ostrom 1991, 2005; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1984). Governments provide 
incentives to NGOs to encourage them to submit to national laws, such as tax breaks and access to 
grant competitions, in return for filing financial statements and adopting specific accounting and 
governance procedures. Governments also enforce penalties on NGOs that do not conform, including 
dissolution in extreme cases as well as loss of tax status, revocation of the ability to lobby, and 
criminal penalties for hiding assets, misallocating assets, or violating national terrorism or hate crime 
laws. 
NGOs, however, are not passive agents forced simply to comply with the regulations or to conform to 
the institutions they confront. International NGOs can choose to relocate to alternative locations with 
different legal strictures (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith and Wiest 2005). Or NGOs can work to 
remake institutions via available political processes such as elections, participation in policy debates, 
and legal challenges through the courts (Prakash and Gugerty 2010; Dalton 1998; Heins 2008). We 
categorize NGO responses to national regulation into five ideal type actions: hiding, shirking, vocal 
opposition, participating, and litigating. We then look for patterns between national counterterrorism 
law post-2001 (and the extent and nature of changes in counterterrorism law post-2001) and NGO 
responses. 
We define hiding as minimal compliance with regulations (Scott 1987). Hiding allows NGOs to avoid 
government attention by complying with just enough of the regulation to escape notice while also 
minimizing any new costs associated with complying with new regulations. For example, hiding would 
describe an organization that did its best to cross-check employees against available government 
terrorist watch lists, but did not take additional measures to certify the employees' legal identities. 
Minimal compliance constitutes a type of free-riding, however. NGOs that hide might want new 
regulations abandoned or reformed, or alternatives put into place, but they are unwilling to bear the 
costs of advocating for such changes (Prakash and Gugerty 2010). Advocacy requires expending 
money on the real costs of funding a campaign, such as hiring lobbyists, printing educational 
materials, or organizing rallies (Dalton 1998; Betsill and Corell 2007). But advocacy also raises the 
risk of punitive measures being imposed by the government on the NGO, including review of tax-
exempt status and fines or penalties for inappropriate/illegal actions, as well as the costs of hiring a 
lawyer and the loss of public support if an NGO is seen to be out of favor with the government. The 
NGOs most likely to hide are those that lack political pull (or protection) in the form of a strong, 
active, and well-connected leadership or membership, and those for which the costs of minimal 
compliance are quite small, particularly when compared to the potential costs of either not complying 
or speaking out aggressively against new regulations. 
Alternatively, NGOs can shirk regulations by deliberately ignoring or avoiding the provisions of a law 
until they are caught and forced to comply by the government (Miller 2005; Johnson and Prakash 
2007; Horn 1995). Shirking allows the NGO to avoid the costs of implementing changes to its behavior 
or organizational structure required by regulation. Shirking also constitutes a passive form of 
resistance to authority. The actor is less vulnerable to reprisals than if it engaged in active resistance, 
but nonetheless undermines government authority by not complying (Scott 1987). In principal-agent 
theory, shirking is argued to be a favored agent behavior in order to maximize agent interests at the 
expense of the principal (Miller 2005). If NGOs do not report their activities and income to the 
government, the government has a more difficult time monitoring their behavior. Most regulations 
include a penalty for shirking (or a reward for not shirking) in order to deter this undesirable behavior 
(Moe 1984; Haubrich 1994; Williamson 1985). Thus NGOs which are caught shirking will be required 
to pay a premium, often in the form of the loss of access to resources (political or economic), a fee, or 
possibly even dissolution (and associated costs to become reestablished). For example, new tax code 
provisions in the United States in 2006 provide for the automatic loss of tax-exempt status for any 
non-profit organization that has not filed the necessary tax forms by October 2010, thus forcing many 
organizations to pay back taxes and report their financial 
information(http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=226030,00.html). The NGOs most 
likely to shirk are, first, those that have the least fear of being caught, possibly because they have few 
government ties, believe they are in compliance with laws, or believe their activities are unlikely to 
lead to violations of the law; and, second, those that face exceptionally high costs for compliance or 
opposition. For example, an aid organization with no government funding working in geographic areas 
where terrorist organizations are known to have many ties to the local populations and where foreign 
employees are unable or unwilling to work would likely need to defy new terrorist regulations to 
continue operating if it believed it could not abandon its projects in the country. 
Some NGOs choose to engage in vocal opposition to government regulations via public protests and 
demonstrations, press releases, educational materials, newspaper editorials, and op-ed pieces. Vocal 
opposition is the strategy most commonly associated with NGOs, and is consistent with scholars' view 
of NGOs as watchdogs and human rights/civil society organizations working to prevent the 
encroachment of government authority (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Heins 2008; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 
1999). The proliferation of NGO websites that clearly present their position on issues, including 
government regulation, demonstrates the importance of vocal opposition as a response to regulation 
on the part of NGOs. For example, strong statements by Human Rights Watch, the 
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, and Open Democracy opposing changes to 
Russian NGO law in 2006 can be found on their websites. Vocal opposition, however, has risks as 
NGOs can be deemed to be disruptive, even anarchists or terrorists, depending upon the form of 
opposition. They may face penalties in the form of changes in tax status and even imprisonment, 
fines, or dissolution as punishment for illegal or inappropriate behavior. NGOs are more likely to turn 
to vocal opposition if their mandate or mission includes monitoring and critiquing government 
behavior, as is common of human rights organizations. NGOs are also more likely to engage in vocal 
opposition if they rarely work collaboratively with government, if they are not dependent upon 
government funding, or if they feel they have exhausted other options. 
Other NGOs choose to work inside political institutions to change regulations rather than challenge 
them from the outside. We term this participating, in that NGOs work with regulators in the form of 
legislators or regulatory agencies to review and revise regulations in ways that are mutually 
satisfactory to both the NGOs and the government. Either as interests lobbying for changes in 
regulations or as expert advisers testifying before government committees (Charnovitz 1997; Dalton 
1998; Betsill and Corell 2007), these NGOs seek to engage and collaborate with government on 
improving regulations to benefit both parties. In this case, NGOs do not see regulations as only 
constraints, but also as legal protections that provide opportunities for NGO activities by limiting 
government authority, by reducing competition from other NGOs, and/or by eliminating "bad" NGOs 
and thereby enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of those that remain (Heins 2008; Brock and 
Banting 2003; Brock 2001). NGOs are more likely to turn to participating as a response if they have a 
history of close relations with the government and if institutional mechanisms exist that make 
participation possible and effective. 
Lastly, NGOs may choose to challenge regulations in court, using litigation to clarify provisions in the 
law and the extent of government authority to enforce new regulations. Not all national political 
systems allow NGOs easy access to the court system. For example, in Japan, NGOs are regulated via 
executive departments that have bureaucratic oversight over them. Litigation is an actively 
confrontational response, like vocal opposition, although from within political institutions rather than 
outside of them. Litigation has the benefit of imposing a binding decision upon both parties, but 
generally results in only marginal changes to laws as court decisions are decided on a one-by-one 
basis as compared to the more comprehensive reform possible through participation in the policy-
making process (Dotan and Hofnung 2005; Hirschl 2008). NGOs founded and/or staffed by lawyers, 
such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, Lawyers for Human Rights, and the American Civil 
Liberties Union, are the most likely to use litigation as a strategy, as these organizations are the best 
able to bring cases to court given their in-house expertise. NGOs are also likely to use litigation as a 
means of clarifying the law in situations of extreme uncertainty regarding the requirements and 
applicability of regulations for either NGOs or the government. Without clarification of the content or 
bounds of the regulation, the NGO is unable to gauge if it can and should comply, and if the 
government is applying and enforcing the regulation correctly. Litigation also resolves the collective 
action problem, as the NGO expects to receive clear, direct, and concentrated benefits for its efforts in 
bringing the case to trial, while free riders may or may not benefit. 
We argue that the political context and the nature of changes to regulation (the extent of the increase 
in the severity of regulation and beliefs about government capacity and intention to enforce new rules) 
are the key determinants of the costs of, and potential for, passive versus active resistance. Minor 
changes in regulations, particularly if combined with improved monitoring and enforcement provisions, 
will make hiding more likely as it is cheaper to hide than resist. Major changes in regulation, especially 
those that create high costs or new risks for NGOs, are likely to promote more active resistance in the 
form of vocal opposition or participation. Changes in regulation without changes to monitoring and 
enforcement capabilities are likely to cause shirking, particularly if there is uncertainty about the new 
requirements imposed on NGOs or about government willingness or ability to enforce new regulations. 
Uncertainty itself is a form of risk and a source of costs for NGOs, and thus new regulations that 
create a great deal of uncertainty, especially if some interpretations of the new law are potentially 
very restrictive, are likely to create strong incentives for active resistance by NGOs via participation or 
litigation. Here the nature of the political system matters. In places in which NGOs have easy access 
to political institutions and a sense of political efficacy (i.e., participating within the political system is 
possible and cost-effective), participating in policy-making is likely (Risse-Kappen 1995). In places in 
which NGOs have more limited access to policy-making, they may turn to litigation, particularly if 
there is a history of successful legal challenges and an adversarial political culture. These ideal types 
of NGO responses to new or changed regulations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Participating 
in the political process to improve regulations might be tried prior to vocal opposition or litigation, 
which could be seen as a fallback option if a participatory approach fails. Similarly, NGOs might switch 
from shirking to hiding if they are caught shirking, or from hiding to more active opposition if new 
reforms impose increased constraints or costs on the NGO. 
Counterterrorism Regulation Post-2001 
In the five countries under study, new regulations were adopted as a result of the tragic events of 
9/11. Yet, for the most part, the new regulations did not constitute a departure, but rather the logical 
continuation of previous legislation in light of the new international context. Almost ten years later, 
many new or amended provisions have rarely or never been used, but the uncertainty and potential 
ambiguity of their interpretation and implementation could lead to tremendous changes in the NGO 
landscape. 
United States 
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was primarily 
responsible for regulating NGOs in the United States. Although the IRS retained a major role after 
9/11, new laws led to more involvement by other government actors in NGO affairs. This new 
involvement, however, did not mark a shift in US regulation of NGOs as much as a continuation of 
existing laws. Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, provided the first terrorist list. The 
assets of groups on that list and of suspected terrorists would be blocked. Helping terrorists in any 
way, including humanitarian assistance and the unintentional provision of expertise, was prohibited. 
Although it clearly went further, this provision was consistent with previous IRS regulations that 
prohibited charities from diverting funds to non-charitable purposes, including funding terrorism (26 
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)). The executive order also presented a definition of terrorism that NGOs and 
academics criticized because it allowed for acts of domestic protest and government dissension to be 
deemed "terrorist" acts (Odendhal 2005, 1; Guinane et al. 2008). The USA Patriot Act was less 
controversial among NGOs than the executive order in that it mostly amended existing legislation by 
increasing sentences for terrorism-related offenses, expanding the definition of material support, and 
officially prohibiting terrorist financing. 
One of the most controversial actions taken by the US government with regard to NGOs post-9/11 
was, interestingly, not a law. After Muslim charities expressed concern about how to protect 
themselves against terrorism, the U.S. Department of Treasury published its "Anti-Terrorist Financing 
Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities" in 2002. A revised version appeared in 
2006. NGOs and academics were (and still are) concerned that the due diligence requirements 
detailed in the guidelines are unrealistic (see Baron (2004) for specific issues). As a result, many 
NGOs are afraid that the guidelines may become de facto law (Sidel 2006, 206; Billica 2006, 17-18). 
Canada 
There were major changes in NGO legislation in Canada post-9/11. However, most of the debate and 
fear in Canada center on uncertainty – not how the new legislation has affected NGOs so far, but how 
it could potentially affect them if interpreted in a certain way. For instance, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism 
Act created the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act (Part 6). The latter makes it possible 
for the government to issue a security certificate against a charity based on intelligence that the 
charity in question has or will provide resources to a terrorist organization or is engaged in terrorist 
activities (section 4(1)). One of the major problems with this act is that the intelligence used to 
produce the security certificate does not have to be shared with the accused NGO (Bloodgood and 
Tremblay-Boire 2010). Yet, as of April 1, 2008, no certificate had been issued by the Canadian 
government (Dept. of Justice 2008). The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act also added new provisions on 
terrorism to the Criminal Code, providing for the listing of organizations or individuals who take part in 
terrorism (83.05), and for the freezing of assets and imprisonment of individuals knowingly assisting 
terrorists (83.02; 83.03; 83.04; 83.08; 83.12). Some in the legal community have criticized the 
definition of "facilitation" employed in the Criminal Code (83.19(2)) because it implies that an NGO 
could be accused of helping terrorists even if it had no knowledge of terrorist activities and even if the 
terrorist act(s) never occurred (Carter 2004; Carter, Carter, and Claridge 2008). 
Uncertainty as to how new regulations may affect charities is also prevalent in the interpretation of the 
amended Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act. Although the law does not explicitly require 
charities to report their financial transactions to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis 
Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), they may be considered as belonging to the residual category of "(g) 
persons and entities authorized under provincial legislation to engage in the business of dealing in 
securities or any other financial instruments, or to provide portfolio management or investment 
advising services" (Proceeds of Crime Act, sec. 5). Other organizations or persons, such as financial 
institutions or accountants, may also be obligated to reveal financial information about NGOs (Carter 
2004; Carter, Carter, and Claridge 2008). 
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom as in the United States, post-9/11 regulations did not mark a departure but 
rather a continuation of existing terrorism legislation. The focus was on adapting domestically oriented 
legislation (created to deal with incidents in Northern Ireland) to a context of international terrorism. 
Provisions prohibiting the funding of terrorism already existed in the UK prior to 9/11 (Terrorism Act 
2000) and penalties remained the same after 9/11. One of the amendments of the Terrorism Act 2006 
provided that an organization could be added to the list of terrorist entities for "glorification" of 
terrorism. As Dunn (2008, 15) explains, however, the term "glorification" is problematic because a 
person only has to consider the behavior as something that should be emulated for it to be unlawful. 
No emulation has to take place. 
After 9/11, new legislation expanded the powers of the Charity Commission, the independent 
government agency responsible for regulating charities in England and Wales. The Charities Act 1993 
had given the right to the Commission to remove NGOs' trustees or employees from their position 
(Part IV, section 18). The Charities Act 2006 allowed the Commission to cancel trustees and 
employees' membership in an organization (Part II, chapter 5, section 19). The Charities Act 1993 had 
given the right to the Commission to conduct inquiries and to request charities' documentation (Part 
II, secs. 8-9). Under the Charities Act 2006, the Commission can now, with a warrant, enter a 
charity's premises and seize documents (Part II, chap. 5, sec. 26). 
Japan 
The Japanese government, like the United Kingdom government, dealt with domestic terrorism for a 
number of years prior to 9/11 (e.g., Aum Shinrikyo and Japan's Red Army). The approach of the 
Japanese government has always been reactive more than proactive (Katzenstein 2003). Incidents 
such as the 1995 sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway did not trigger the enactment of legislation to 
prevent terrorism, but rather led to efforts to manage crises effectively. Terrorism was handled 
through police presence, not legislation (Katzenstein 2003). The events of 9/11 have resulted in the 
same type of "crisis management" response in Japan. The Anti-terrorist Special Measure Act 
immediately committed the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) to provide assistance (e.g., fuel, 
transportation, humanitarian assistance) in the international fight against terrorism (Embassy of 
Japan, 2001; Katzenstein, 2003, 752). In 2003 and 2004, the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure 
National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack and the Law Concerning Measures 
for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations established procedures in case of 
an armed attack against Japan. None of these regulations relate to NGOs. 
The 2004 Action Plan for the Prevention of Terrorism was created by the Japanese government to 
implement the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Since FATF's Special 
Recommendation VIII is explicitly directed toward non-profit organizations as a source of terrorist 
financing (FATF 2009), the Action Plan should have affected NGOs. Yet the Japanese government does 
not even mention NGOs in its plan. Nonetheless, NGOs could be affected indirectly, as laws 
implemented as part of the plan prohibit funding of terrorism and demand that financial institutions 
report suspicious transactions to the Japanese Financial Intelligence Office (Headquarters, 2004, 21; 
Kishima, 2004). 
Germany 
Germany, which had been the target of domestic terrorism prior to 9/11 (e.g., Red Army Faction 
(RAF)), focused on adapting domestically oriented legislation to the post-9/11 international terrorism 
context. The government shortened the discussion period for two acts, Security Packages I and II, in 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Security Package I was in preparation prior to 9/11, but Security 
Package II (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz) was drafted as a direct result of the attacks. Security 
Package I expanded German jurisdiction to the European Union as a whole, prohibiting the formation 
of terrorist groups anywhere in the EU and allowing prosecution of terrorists for acts perpetrated 
outside the EU if the offender is German (or a German resident), is found in Germany, or if a victim is 
German (German Criminal Code, art. 129a, 129b). Security Package II abolished the religious 
privilege, which meant that religious organizations were now subject to the Act Governing Private 
Associations (Vereinsgesetz) like any other NGO. Rau (2004, 316) states that the abolition of religious 
privilege was under discussion for some time, but the events of 9/11 served as a catalyst in reaching 
approval. Security Package II also amended the provision on associations of aliens (non-EU citizens) in 
the Act Governing Private Associations (Vereinsgesetz) by including additional reasons to prohibit 
them (Rau 2004). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Intelligence 
Service were granted more powers, such as access to financial information and computer surveillance. 
In 2002, new legislation on money laundering, the Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act (Viertes 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) and the Money Laundering Prevention Act 
(Geldwäschebekämpfungsgesetz), implemented a computer system capable of freezing assets and 
added a provision obligating bank officials, accountants, and other individuals to divulge suspicious 
financial transactions to the Financial Intelligence Unit (Codexter 2004, 6-7). 
INGO Responses to Counterterrorism Regulations in Case Countries 
Based on insights from the new economics of organization and sociological institutionalism that we 
used to define the ideal types presented above, we have the following expectations about NGO 
responses to regulatory changes in the five countries examined. First, we hypothesize that the more 
extensive and invasive the changes in counterterrorism regulation, and thus the greater the costs 
imposed by the new rules, the more likely NGOs are to take an active approach (vocal opposition, 
participation, or litigation) rather than a passive approach (hiding or shirking) to regulation. Second, 
we expect that if changes to the regulation include elements that improve the government's ability to 
monitor and enforce the law, NGOs will be less likely to shirk. Third, if changes to counterterrorism 
regulation are costly for NGOs, and if national political institutions permit participation, then we expect 
to see more participation. But if changes to regulation are costly for NGOs, and political participation is 
not possible or effective, then we expect to see litigation. Fourth, if there are major changes to 
counterterrorism regulation that generate uncertainty about the correct interpretation or application of 
the law, we expect to see litigation as a means to clarify appropriate behavior by NGOs and states, or 
hiding to avoid possible political targeting in an uncertain and thus risky environment. 
United States 
NGO responses to changes in counterterrorism regulations in the United States have run the gamut 
from hiding and shirking to litigation. The extent of the changes in the regulations requiring due 
diligence, given the lack of previous counterterrorism regulation, imposed high costs (at least if 
regulations are fully enforced) on many NGOs. Free-riding among NGOs, given the size and diversity 
of the NGO community, and the lack of means to influence counterterrorism policy given the closed 
nature of US policy-making on national security matters, have meant that participation is not an 
appealing choice for NGOs in the US. Many NGOs also feared retribution should they engage in vocal 
opposition to new laws. A report by OMB Watch and Grantmakers Without Borders (2008, 8) found 
that "Executive directors and boards fear reprisals ranging from freezing assets to seizing of 
equipment and materials—and all cloaked under secrecy." NGOs' concerns were reinforced by ACLU 
accusations of FBI spying on advocacy groups engaged in legal protest activities (Washington Post, 
12/20/2005; Guinane 2007; Sidel 2008; Guinane et al. 2008). 
Hiding and shirking are thus preferred responses for many NGOs within the US. A survey conducted 
by the Council on Foundations in 2005 found most large NGOs were revising their due diligence 
procedures and checking terrorist lists. Smaller public charities usually conducted list-checking, but 
with less regularity than large NGOs. Small NGOs with strong domestic mandates were the least likely 
to comply because their administrators believed their current policies were appropriate given their low 
risk of funding terrorism (Buchanan 2005). Other large NGOs also shirked, however. A survey by the 
Chronicle of Philanthropy (8/19/2004) revealed that many major international NGOs, including Doctors 
Without Borders, Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund, and the United Way of America, had 
not verified their employees against government terrorist lists as quickly or as often as required. Many 
NGOs also shirked new provisions for accounting more precisely for their foreign income and 
expenditures within 990 tax forms by not filing promptly, thus leading to new laws making loss of tax 
status automatic for failure to file several years in a row. 
NGOs have also used court challenges to clarify provisions for "material support," due process, and 
necessary probable cause to freeze NGO assets (Humanitarian Law Project et al. v. Gonzales et al. 
2005; Holder, Attorney General, et al. v. Humanitarian Law Project et al. 2010; KindHearts for 
Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc. v. Geithner et al. 2009; Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, 
Inc., et al. v. Obama et al. 2010). Cases have generally been brought by NGOs founded by lawyers or 
as the last resort of NGOs being targeted by the US government for dissolution under new 
counterterrorism regulations. 
Canada 
Although neither as formally institutionalized nor as powerful as the Charity Commission in the UK, the 
Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI) in Canada created in 1995 has provided a means of participation for 
NGOs in policy-making and implementation via coordinated partnership opportunities with the 
Government of Canada (http://www.vsi-isbc.org/eng/about/history.cfm). The VSI also helped NGOs in 
Canada overcome collective action problems to work together for regulatory changes. It is thus 
consistent with our expectations that participation has been the dominant NGO response in Canada. 
Representatives from the Canadian Bar Association, Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), 
Amnesty International, the Canadian Red Cross, World Vision, the International Civil Liberties 
Monitoring Group, the Canadian Council for Refugees, the Canadian Islamic Congress, the Muslim 
Council of Montreal, and Imagine Canada all participated in legislative debate prior to the passage of 
the Anti Terrorism Act and during the 2005 review of the Act. These NGOs each submitted written 
and/or oral testimony to multiple Senate and Commons committees (Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 
2010). 
Uncertainty about the scope of some provisions in the new counterterrorism regulation, particularly 
the definition of terrorist activities and concerns that this may outlaw previously legal forms of political 
dissent, has sparked some litigation for clarification. In the 2006 case R. v. Khawaja, Justice 
Rutherford of the Ontario Supreme Court determined that parts of the definition violated section two 
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, however the list of offenses included in the Anti-Terrorism Act 
was acceptable (Carter et al. 2008, 50; Roach 2007). Given the scope of changes in counterterrorism 
regulation after 2001, and thus the potential risks for political targeting of NGOs via a broad 
application of government powers, a mix of litigation and participation is largely consistent with our 
expectations. It is unclear, however, if the VSI has eliminated hiding and shirking by most NGOs, 
given the close working relations many NGOs have with the government, or if participation simply 
overshadows incidents of shirking or hiding. 
United Kingdom 
Although civil society's response to counterterrorism measures in the UK has been slow and relatively 
isolated until 2007 (CCS 2007, 5), there appears to be a movement toward more involvement by 
NGOs, mostly of the participatory type. Some NGO responses are more confrontational. For instance, 
because civil society had not been "meaningfully" consulted in the drafting of the Home Office review 
on the protection of charities from terrorist abuse, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(NCVO) produced its own report on the impact of counter-terrorism measures on civil society (Quigley 
and Pratten 2007). Others responses are more conciliatory. Numerous charities participated in the 
consultations launched by the Charity Commission (almost 200 organizations, according to the 
Commission's website) and by the Home Office and HM Treasury in May 2007 and July 2010 (see for 
example the response prepared by Liberty at http://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy10/from-war-to-law-final-pdf-with-bookmarks.pdf). Some NGOs, like BOND 
(British Overseas NGOs for Development), are actively cooperating with the Charity Commission in the 
preparation of compliance toolkits for counter-terrorism laws. Whether confrontational or conciliatory, 
these responses are all participatory in nature because they seek to engage government regulators 
and arrive at mutually beneficial legislation. 
Considering that the regulatory environment did not change drastically after 9/11 in the UK, a 
participatory response by NGOs mostly confirms our expectations. The increase in the severity of 
counter-terrorist regulations was minimal in the UK, with the addition of the "glorification" provision 
but unchanged penalties for acts of terrorism. Based on our hypotheses, this would potentially suggest 
hiding, but no evidence confirmed such a reaction. However, NGOs have easy access to political 
institutions and a sense of political efficacy in the UK, which enables participation. The UK government 
demonstrated its willingness to enforce counter-terrorist legislation by expanding the powers of the 
Charity Commission, but the position of the Commission as both independent enforcer and adviser to 
the NGO community limited active NGO resistance. By actively seeking NGO feedback, the Charity 
Commission ensured that NGOs had a mechanism to participate in the legislative process. Moreover, 
by demonstrating its independence from the American government and its impartiality, notably in the 
Interpal case, we believe that the Commission was able to establish a relationship of trust with civil 
society that is not as present in the other countries under study. 
Japan 
Japanese counterterrorism measures have traditionally and contemporarily targeted emergency 
response and civil defense, rather than any perceived threat from an overlap between civil society and 
terrorist organizations. As changes to counterterrorism regulations post-2001 have been minor and 
unrelated to NGOs' activities or interests, the lack of NGO response to counterterrorism regulation in 
Japan is unsurprising. NGOs in Japan have not needed to hide or shirk counterterrorism regulation. 
Their participation in policy-making is institutionally limited, given the corporatist nature of Japanese 
governance (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991) and NGOs' strict control by executive agencies (Pekkanen 
2006). There have been no attempts at litigation on counterterrorism regulations by NGOs in Japan. 
Germany 
Vocal opposition has clearly been the favored resistance type in Germany. A group of German NGOs, 
led by Humanistische Union (Humanist Union), produces an annual report detailing state human rights 
abuses, notably through its increased surveillance powers. Amnesty International (AI), Privacy 
International (PI), and the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) also publicly 
criticize Germany for human rights violations related to the country's counter-terrorism laws. Some of 
the accusations include inappropriate treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, excessive use of 
force by police officers, unconstitutional investigations and raids against journalists, and violations of 
privacy (see for example AI, 2008; Banisar, 2008; IHF, 2003). The European Federation of Journalists 
(EFJ) opposed a counter-terrorism law that would force journalists to divulge their sources if asked. 
The law was passed, leading journalists, lawyers, and doctors to initiate judicial procedures, arguing 
that the law is unconstitutional (IFJ/IFEX, "German Parliament Defeats Anti-Terrorism Law"; IPI/IFEX, 
"More German Journalists Join Battle"). Other groups, such as the Einstellung der §129(a)-Verfahren - 
sofort! (Coalition for the Immediate End to the § 129(a) Proceedings), have focused on the abolition of 
specific terrorism provisions (in this case, § 129(a)) and on the liberation of individuals, including 
academics, accused under these provisions. 
In Germany, more than any other case, regulatory changes directly and explicitly targeted INGOs. 
Although new counter-terrorist regulations were largely consistent with prior regulations, there were 
some significant departures, such as the suspension of the religious privilege. The German 
government also markedly increased surveillance powers by providing new technological tools and 
allowing agencies to put individuals under surveillance without informing them. Major regulatory 
changes and demonstrations of governmental capacity and willingness to enforce the new regulations 
suggest active NGO resistance, either through vocal opposition or participation. The evidence 
corroborates our expectations as major acts of protest, often by reputable NGOs, have taken place in 
Germany. Furthermore, we argued that uncertainty about regulations and the failure of other means 
of response should lead to resistance through litigation. The German experience supports this 
expectation. There were no clear boundaries to the vast expansion of surveillance powers in Germany, 
leading to abuse by police forces and multiple appeals to courts by NGOs and interest groups to 
reestablish a balance. 
Conclusions and Implications for Future Change 
We find that in five cases of relatively similar countries experiencing a common threat in the form of 
transnational terrorism, the responses of NGOs have varied substantially. In the case of Japan, where 
regulation changed little and did not target NGOs as a security threat, NGOs did not respond at all. In 
the cases of the US and Germany, where regulations changed the most, NGOs engaged in vocal 
opposition and litigation, the most active and confrontational responses. In the UK and Canada, where 
regulation changed somewhat but in ways consistent with past regulation, NGOs participated in policy-
making processes to refine and reform the new rules. Our hypotheses were roughly supported—minor 
changes in rules (Japan) brought less active responses than major changes (US and Germany); major 
changes that created uncertainty produced litigation to clarify new rules (US, Germany, and Canada); 
increased monitoring by the government reduced shirking (US and Germany); and in cases in which 
governments provided institutions to enable NGOs to participate, they did so (UK and Canada). While 
we have focused on counterterrorism regulations, we believe that the same ideal type NGO 
responses—hiding, shirking, vocal opposition, participating, and litigating—would be found in response 
to changes in other aspects of NGOs' regulatory environment. Furthermore, the same three factors—
the extent and nature of any change in regulations, the uncertainty (and risk) that changes create, 
and the nature of institutions for political participation—would be important for explaining why NGOs 
respond as they do to national changes in regulation. Efforts to clarify and specify counterterrorism 
measures, and their direct impact on NGOs, would likely help to reduce vocal opposition and litigation. 
That said, if counterterrorism measures are highly constraining and authoritarian, NGOs are likely to 
continue to work to change these measures, some working collaborative with government, some 
shirking, and others acting openly in opposition to government. NGO hiding and shirking is likely to 
prove threatening for both national security and NGOs' political development in the long run. These 
behaviors may result in a loss of accountability and legitimacy as well as deteriorating relationships 
between NGOs and government. Hiding and shirking are also symptoms of collective action failure, 
and a coordinated global campaign may be needed by NGOs to press for more NGO-friendly and 
effective counterterrorism measures cross-nationally. 
Country 
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